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The European Union (EU), such as it is, remains the most developed project in
transnational democracy. As a polity, it has progressed to the constitutional phase,
in the sense that its democratic legitimacy has become an issue for public deliber-
ation and popular ratification. The likely failure of its current constitutional pro-
posal seems to many to be a stunning defeat for those who have taken up the cause
of establishing democracy beyond the nation state. However important for emerg-
ing polities, constitutionalism is nonetheless only one aspect of democratic legiti-
macy (albeit one that is particularly important in an institutional structure as com-
plex as the EU, which has grown by layers in different treaties). The need for
democratic legitimacy was already explicitly recognized in the Maastricht Treaty,
a central purpose of which was already to democratize the EU. However, some
treaty provisions with this aim may have had unintended undemocratic conse-
quences, such as making decision making less transparent. The impasse of the
current constitutional convention shows the many difficulties and dilemmas that
any polity inevitably confronts when creating legitimate institutions of democra-
tic reform, all of which cumulatively lead to a potentially vicious circle: it is not
democratic enough to propose the means and ends for achieving its own democ-
ratization.
Despite the seeming impasse that the failure to ratify the constitution may
bring about, several different possibilities for democratization beyond the nation
state remain open to the EU, each of which depends on a different understanding
of the type of political body the EU is supposed to be. The most familiar option
takes the EU to be a formal intergovernmental organization of states, by which the
constitutionalism implicit in the treaties creates a normative framework for inter-
governmental regulation for the sake of common interests. Here the parties to the
constitution are member states, and thus the intergovernmental organizations that
are established by the treaties have democratic legitimacy indirectly, through the
delegation of state authority. In this constitutional context, the principal/citizen is
empowered to demand greater transparency and accountability from the
agent/organization, so that the focus of any process of democratic reform is found
in determining the scope of delegated authority and in providing a clearer defini-
tion of the principals. This is certainly how citizens often try to influence interna-
tional organizations such as NAFTA or the WTO, whose purposes are specific and
functional rather than political. On the other hand, the EU has for more than a
decade been shifting from its self-conception as an economic community with a
common market, and is now engaging in polity building as a community of com-
munities. The most significant marker of the success of transnational political
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legitimacy is the emergence of distinctly European citizenship with its own rights
and powers, a significant step already taken in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. In
order to be distinctive, the normative powers of European citizens have to be at
least potentially independent from their powers as citizens of individual member
states. And yet, aside from lines at airports and judicial petitions, the benefits of
European citizenship still pale in comparison to the rich array of rights and oppor-
tunities that have emerged from long historical struggles for democratic reform
within states.
One of the central features of democratic constitutionalism is lacking in any
such treaty-based understanding of the «material constitution» that effectively
governs the European Union: namely, that «the People» can be the source of
democratic renewal and change. Lacking a constitution to solve this problem, it is
unclear how the EU can become more democratic, and can thus democratize itself
to some degree, much less become a democracy. Since the EU is an unprecedented
political community, questions about the nature of its future democracy remain
open. What sort of democracy is suggested by some of the more novel aspects of
the European integration? How can its deliberation be organized? Most of all, how
can it creatively solve the problem of creating legitimate transnational institutions
and methods for democratic reform, including, if necessary, a more democratic
process of constitution making?
I begin my argument about constitutionalism beyond the nation state by dis-
cussing three necessary conditions for legitimate institutions for reform: these
include formal, deliberative, and popular conditions. I argue that even in the
absence of a fully constitutionalized condition for formal legitimacy, it is still pos-
sible for the European Union to initiate democratic reform processes that have
deliberative and popular legitimacy. Second, I argue that the fundamental reflex-
ive aim of the constitution itself as well as of the popular and deliberative
processes of constitution making must be to create conditions of legitimate demo-
cratic reform. Central to the reform of the EU is the development of a more
robustly deliberative citizenship, in which citizens have the minimum normative
powers necessary for genuine democratization. Even if there are abundant reasons
why the constitution should concern itself with problems of organizing democra-
tic authority across the various levels and sites of political power and authority,
these issues cannot be addressed until the vicious circle of the democratic illegiti-
macy of the European Union is overcome. Finally, in dealing with this second
issue, I suggest some ways in which these deliberative and popular deficits can be
overcome with respect to the process and aims of constitution making itself.
Addressing such procedural issues is not yet sufficient to understand the prob-
lems of democratizing the transnational polity. For this reason, it is first necessary
to reach an understanding of the specific problem that a transnational constitution
is supposed to solve: the republican problem of nondomination. Attending to the
lack of democratic legitimacy and the related increased potential for domination
by transnational institutions might help in understanding the democratically moti-
vated discontent felt by many citizens within the EU. Before making specific pro-
posals concerning the provisions of a transnational constitution, however, the
novelty of this polity makes it necessary to reconstruct the European Union as an
ideal type, in order to show just where such problems of domination might occur
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and what resources exist for addressing them in innovative practices and institu-
tions, which resources may themselves be useful in organizing legitimate
processes of constitutional reform in a transnational rather than merely a national
manner. Above all, democratization requires new popular and deliberative
processes. If you want to reform a transnational polity, you have to ask the right
people under the right description, as having normative powers to establish their
own duties and obligations. Getting this type of democratic reform off the ground
requires some formal legitimacy, even if the formal conditions are themselves the
objects of change.
DEMOCRATICALLY LEGITIMATE REFORM
In the existing structure of the European Union, power of initiative is shared
by the member states through the Council. That is, such a power resides in the
executive branch, with a procedure for its being carried out by a mixed body. For
this reason, the 1994 constitutional proposal is a product of the current treaty
structure, and inherits all of its problems of democratic legitimacy. I do not con-
sider other possible sources of legitimacy, such as problem solving capacity or
effectiveness emphasized by Fritz Scharf as «outcome legitimacy»1. In most con-
stitutional democracies, there are three different aspects of democratic legitimacy,
broadly understood, that play the role of legitimating democratic reforms. I will
illustrate each of these aspects of legitimate democracy reform through processes
that are part of constitution making or constitutional change. The formal legiti-
macy of any process of reform is found in the institutional authority to initiate it,
through specified in the amendment procedure of a constitution or the authority
structure of an organization that permits change. Popular legitimacy is found to
the extent that the People have genuine opportunities to shape or assent to such
reform, minimally the popular ratification of proposed changes or amendment,
and that these opportunity are common knowledge among citizens. Popular legit-
imacy has a belief component, but is not reducible to citizens’ pro or con attitudes.
Finally, democratic reform has deliberative legitimacy, to the extent that the delib-
erative process of citizens offering reasons to each other in mutual justification
plays some role, such as an influence over the process of drafting of the constitu-
tion or parts of a constitution. Deliberative legitimacy is usually measured by the
quality of deliberation: that is, either by qualities such as the freedom, openness or
publicity of the deliberative process, or by the quality of the reasons or outcomes,
as measured by some independent standard. While the latter, more epistemic stan-
dard is preferred in some forms of inquiry, it is unlikely that a constitutional pro-
posal can be settled by appeal to some procedure-independent standard.
It is now clear that the proposed EU constitution has little more than formal
legitimacy, especially since the process of its formation lacked any genuinely
deliberative and popular features. Its deliberative resources were internal to the
body that was formed by the Council and thus only served to increase the popular
1 See Fritz Scharf, Governing in Europe: Effective or Democratic (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1999).
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sense of illegitimacy. We might get the same result in Canada or the United States
if proposed changes to the formal structure of NAFTA were put up for a vote,
since NAFTA more clearly than the EU lacks the resources to reform itself demo-
cratically (given that its formal legitimacy could be met by the bylaws of the orga-
nization and its deliberative legitimacy refers to panels of experts as the subjects
of deliberation). But such merely formal legitimacy is not yet democratic, pre-
cisely because it does not require that the opinions and interests of those outside
the formally named bodies need to be heard and addressed. In fact, no one except
these formally designated members has any legitimate say in the process of
proposing such reforms, except in the ratification phase. Above all, the current
constitution codifies rather than improves the status quo and thus does not respond
to the popular dissatisfaction with the current EU structure.
The problem goes even deeper for the EU, since there is no «People» (yet) that
it is organizing institutionally, but rather it has the stated overarching purpose of
«bringing the peoples of Europe together in a closer Union». The «peoples» that
were to ratify the treaty were the national publics, not the citizens of Europe.
When put to a vote to ask these peoples as citizens of member states, the publics
of France and the Netherlands rejected the democratic legitimacy of this constitu-
tion as a democratic reform. The purpose of the democratic reform would be to
address the issue of the potential losses of freedom from domination in a polity in
which the political subject of democracy is plural, demoi rather than a demos2.
This attempt to create a democracy of demoi may seem paradoxical if citizens are
to achieve the ideal of self-rule by becoming both authors and subjects of the laws
of Europe3. Yet, as Bruce Ackerman has pointed out against such a «monistic»
interpretation of constitutional structures, there is no one privileged place in
which the popular will is located by some naïve synecdoche that takes the part for
the whole. The EU has no legislative body, since its Parliament does not have the
authority to enact the law directly. The only solution is, then, as Henry Richardson
has put it, to look for a way in which «the processes that form the popular will can
be distributed across the various parts of the constitutional structure»4. The diffi-
culty here is that in the case of the European Union, it is the executive power of
the Council, as empowered in the 1993 Laeken Declaration that has the legitimate
right to make such a proposal, independently of any exercise of the popular will.
But if citizens are to be engaged both as citizens of Europe and of the member
states, their will must be engaged at various stages and locations in the process.
For all the difficulties of formal legitimacy in the EU, the initiative of execu-
tive power need not exclude popular legitimacy. Here we might think of other
institutions of legitimate democratic reform. For example, a Citizens’ Assembly
was empowered by the Premier of British Columbia to make a specific proposal
for the reform of the province’s electoral system as the result of internal processes
2 On this point, see James Bohman, «From Demos to Demoi: Democracy Across Borders», Ratio
Juris 18:3 (2005), 293-314.
3 Jürgen Habermas, «Why Europe Needs a Constitution», New Left Review (2001), 11: 5-26.
4 For one version of such a view, see Henry Richardson, Democratic Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 70. Besides distributive views, Habermas’ arguments for «decentered»
processes of will formation offer another alternative to the requirement of a unified democratic will.
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of deliberation among the randomly chosen ordinary citizens who made up the
Assembly. Seen as a product of delegated executive power, something more than
the transfer of normative powers is required for the Assembly to acquire fuller
popular democratic legitimacy: namely, that the transparent process of its con-
struction make it a minipublic in Archon Fung’s terms5. As a minipublic, the
Assembly used its delegated power by deliberating as citizen-representatives on
behalf of the people, whose will could best be formed under the more ideal condi-
tions that were fulfilled in the Assembly’s deliberation (especially considering the
complexities of various voting systems). The legitimating potential of such
empowered participation in this case did not reside in the mere fact that the selec-
tion process somehow mirrored the wider public, but rather in the way in which
the Assembly’s judgment helps to shape public judgment about reform processes
in some normative sense – as the opinion that the public ought to hold. The force
of such a claim must be tested when the powers of the Assembly are transferred
back to the public as a whole. In order to secure popular as well as deliberative
legitimacy, the Assembly’s proposal had to be voted upon by all citizens.
Nonetheless, the direct participation of citizens in the proposal stage permits
many citizens to already recognize its popular legitimacy even if the collective
body of citizens was not actually present in deliberation. If this kind of procedure
were repeated in various states or locations throughout the European Union, then
it would not be paradoxical at all that the proposal voted upon would have some
kind of popular credentials and thus increased democratic legitimacy.
In order to understand popular legitimacy democratically, however, more
needs to be said about how such delegated exercises of citizens’ powers are con-
sistent with popular rule understood distributively. Here we may appeal to some
idea of minimum popular democratic legitimacy, or more simply to the democra-
tic minimum that makes citizens the sources of authority. Citizens would have to
deliberate by employing just these shared normative powers ascribed to them in
virtue of being citizens, and not merely those specific powers delegated to them
by the Council’s executive power. The Council itself, which delegated its powers
to an intergovernmental body of representatives of heads of state and national par-
liaments with no mechanisms for popular consultation, produced the current pro-
posal. Thus, the source of the legitimacy of the proposal is merely intergovern-
mental, and its deliberations did not carry with them deliberative or popular
legitimacy accorded by the direct or indirect deliberation of citizens at large. Hav-
ing no sense of the popular legitimacy of the constitution making process, the pop-
ulus asserted its normative powers and exercised its freedom by saying «no» when
they lacked no other power.
The democratic minimum requires more of legitimate authority than that it
simply grant the permission to be consulted (here by a body of citizens that such
an authority created). The inadequacy of consultation without empowerment can
in fact be seen through the classical republican contrast between citizen and slave.
Unlike slaves, citizens have the shared ability to initiate deliberation; this entails
the ability not just to have officials or rulers respond to their interests, but also to
5 See Archon Fung, «Recipes for Public Spheres», The Journal of Political Philosophy 3 (2003),
338-367.
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set the items on an agenda and thus to be secure in their freedom from domination.
As Arendt put it: «Beginning, before it becomes an historical event, is the supreme
human capacity; politically, it is identical with human freedom.» 6 This capacity
marks the specific democratic contrast between citizen and slave, between having
distinctively political rights that entail normative powers to do certain things and
the inability to participate effectively in the absence of such powers. As Isaiah
Berlin noted, this is true even if the master is an enlightened, liberal-minded
despot or Rousseauian lawgiver who may permit a large measure of personal free-
dom, since whatever freedoms are granted to the slave, she remains dominated
and thus lacks any intrinsic normative authority (or powers) even over herself; at
best, she may only respond to the initiatives of others. Thus, the capacity to begin,
rather than permission to be consulted or even given opportunities for contesta-
tion, provides the basic measure for the normative status of persons required for
the democratic minimum.
Consider two alternative accounts. Both Philip Pettit’s account of tracking and
Allen Buchanan’s interpretation of accountability and human rights offer more
minimal views of the democratic minimum. Both might object that in order to
have the minimum of democratic legitimacy one does not have to be able to initi-
ate deliberation so much as to hold those who do deliberate accountable. Accord-
ing to Pettit, assemblies and minipublics are justified for being better able to
«track» the «public good» of citizens than officials, where the democratic mini-
mum is understood here in objectivist terms as something that officials can fail to
track correctly for epistemic reasons7. Domination, however, is not merely due to
epistemic failures, but is more a matter of who is entitled to offer interpretations
of the public’s good. Moreover, it would be equally wrong to say that deliberative
assemblies must merely track, but rather also serve to form the popular will (rather
than be ruled by the reasoning of others). In Buchanan’s perhaps more modest
alternative, the democratic minimum is related to accountability, which, he writes,
is achieved by attaining the right combination of «representative institutions that
most reliably achieve the accountability necessary for protecting basic human
rights»8. While desirable in itself, such accountability and the formal legitimacy it
would entail need not be the specific goal of a new constitution, since it is not clear
that strengthening the powers of representatives in the European Parliament by
itself would be sufficient to gain much popular or deliberative legitimacy. Neither
Pettit nor Buchanan succeeds in defining the minimum so that it is sufficiently
fine-grained, prospective, and open to placing second-order questions about insti-
tutions and procedural justice on the democratic agenda. Satisfying these
demands requires that such political rights and the powers of citizens function as
the mediating terms between democracy and justice.
In order to develop the virtues of this particular republican account, the demo-
cratic threshold of «freedom as the capacity to begin» can be further operational-
ized in two ways: first, in terms of the capacity of citizens to amend the basic nor-
6 Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1976), 479.
7 See Philip Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998), 88ff.
8 See Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2004), ch. 3.
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mative framework, that is, the power to change the ways in which rights and
duties are assigned; and second, in terms of the capacity of citizens to set an item
on an open agenda, and thus to initiate joint, public deliberation. The first problem
is solved via constitutionalism, in the broad sense of the term. A political order
meets the democratic minimum in the first case only if it is a suitably reflexive
order. Instituting reflexive democratic powers over the agenda as one such nor-
mative power solves the second problem. Even with these powers in place, con-
stitutions cannot guarantee that citizens are the fully self-determining authors of
all their obligations. As a result, such capacity to initiate a challenge and reorder
the legal order itself (including rights, duties, and boundaries) is a necessary con-
dition for nondomination. The institution of these constitutional features of demo-
cratic reflexivity is not an apparent goal of the EU draft convention, and the goal
of democratization in the treaties is the limited condition of transparency.
In both these respects, a more reflexively democratic constitution gives citi-
zens normative powers over normative powers, and political rights that include
the power to change the assignment of rights and duties. However, it may be nec-
essary to develop new institutions and forums for deliberation for this to be possi-
ble. More specifically, greater institutional differentiation and new normative
powers may be necessary when the existing forms of will formation do not suc-
ceed in creating the proper distributive conditions for forming a popular will.
Only in virtue of participating in forming such a popular will are citizens able to
see the constitution as democratic rather than as arbitrarily imposed. Once initi-
ated, the capacity of citizens to deliberate about the terms of democratic gover-
nance, including the rights, duties and powers of citizenship, constitutes a source
of democratic legitimacy: the popular legitimacy provided by the opportunity and
the capacity of citizens to exercise their freedoms, and then to decide upon and
authoritatively enact such reform, since this is what explains the value of ratifica-
tion votes. The democratic minimum, rather than the veto exercised in voting, is
the source of distributed popular legitimacy.
Even with this increased overall democratic legitimacy, citizens may still decide
that the constitutional proposals for reform lack deliberative legitimacy for proce-
dural reasons. Considered more fully, the claim to deliberative legitimacy is much
stronger than popular legitimacy as such: namely, that if other citizens underwent a
similar process, they too would arrive at a similar reasoned judgment, and that this
fact is manifest to other citizens in the deliberative role. Thus, the judgment is not
only for reasons that they could accept, but also for reasons that they could accept
owing specifically to the recognition of the deliberative legitimacy of the minipub-
lic that proposes the changes. The internal deliberative legitimacy achieved proce-
durally among participants does not automatically extend to those who have not par-
ticipated in it. It is clear then that the procedures used to increase the deliberative
legitimacy of democratic reform may fail to attain the proper threshold of popular
legitimacy and are furthermore subject to the same sort of veto.
By putting all these aspects of legitimacy together, we get a much more com-
plex and demanding picture of democratic reform. This process is often complex
and unsuccessful even in normal politics, which is distributed in deliberations and
votes in a legislative body, approval and testing by courts and the executive, and
administrative implementation. In the case of democratic and constitutional
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reform, the process is even more protracted and requires many different steps, but
it can issue in a popular will to change those very institutions that have not yet
formed a popular will. In the end, formal, popular and deliberative legitimacy
should be manifested at various locations and stages of the process (even if in the
case of democratically illegitimate institutions reform can be initiated without any
formal legitimacy whatsoever). In this sense, Rousseau is right that popular sov-
ereignty should not be alienated into any particular deliberative body or institu-
tional location but distributed across the whole constitutional structure and
extended across long periods of will formation.
The power of initiative possessed by all citizens who participate in delibera-
tion is crucial for judging the deliberative legitimacy of the results. While the
attempt to make a minipublic or popular assembly duly and descriptively repre-
sentative seems to be an appropriate goal in the case of constructing a minipublic
for electoral reform, the distributed character of institutions of democratic change
lessens the legitimating significance of representativeness. Once deliberation
begins, issues such as procedural openness and the availability of a proper set of
alternative proposals play a more direct role. One consequence of this complex
process is that in cases of democratic reform, deliberation is historically extended,
sometimes for decades, as the popular will is still being formed. At the very least,
that is what the negative results of the current referenda indicate. In cases of con-
flict, citizens look to the quality and responsiveness of the process of deliberation
to ensure that the addressees of the justification have been able to shape the dis-
cussion and its outcome in relevant ways.
This leads to the general conclusion that I want to draw from this section. The
popular will that legitimates the reform itself could only be formed if the process
of constitution making and ratification already had all the hallmarks of legitimate
institutions of democratic reform. In the case of the European Union, the process
must not only be formally, popularly and deliberatively legitimate, it must also
have an added feature: it must to some degree instantiate the requirements of legit-
imacy of the kind of democracy that it is meant to institute. It could well be con-
stitutionally legitimate when judged post facto. For that reason, it must distribute
the popular will in a way that is appropriate to the type of transnational polity that
it is, rather than by a process that is based upon an interpretation of its legitimacy
as an intergovernmental body that is many degrees of delegation removed from
democratic sources of political authority9. This reflexivity is a further feature of
legitimate institutions of democratic reform. Above all, for transnational polities
such as the EU, the body of citizens or officials that proposes the new constitution
must be transnational and not intergovernmental.
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY:
RECONSTRUCTING THE IDEAL TYPE
OF A TRANSNATIONAL POLITY
9 Robert Dahl, «Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View», in Democ-
racy’s Edges, C. Hacker-Cordon and I. Shapiro (eds.), (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1999), 19-37.
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In the last section, I argued that the democratic core of constitutionalism is tied
to its reflexive character, that is, to its capacity to make the basis of democracy
itself the subject of the democratic deliberation of citizens. Such a self-transfor-
mative polity requires that a constitution enable its citizens to have just this nor-
mative power, a power that can be exercised in the capability to initiate delibera-
tion that may change the terms of democratic cooperation. If the institutional
structure is large and multileveled (as the EU’s surely is), then this power must be
present not merely in its legislative and parliamentary core, but must also be dis-
tributed throughout its various levels and dispersed sites of deliberation. From the
criterion of nondomination implied by the democratic minimum, it also follows
that some distinctly transnational form of federalism is the proper general type of
institutional design, provided that it could be shown to be adequate to the democ-
ratic minimum with respect to the imposition of order and the possibilities of pop-
ular control. It also follows that the democratic deficit of the EU is in the case of
democratic reform more properly a «deliberation deficit» that also leads to a
«popular deficit».
Some have argued that deliberative legitimacy is local, rising to no higher
level that that of a nation state10. Properly organized with dispersed power, how-
ever, large and numerous units also have deliberative advantages. At least some
existing practices of the EU employ particular institutional structures of coopera-
tion to take advantage of the dispersal of power and deliberation in multi-leveled
and polycentric polities. These diverse and dispersed structures could be (or
become) democratic insofar as they are constitutional orders that provide for
deliberation about the proper location for any political deliberation and authoriza-
tion. Without allowing for access to political influence over just such decisions,
larger democracies have the potential for dominating smaller ones in transnational
polities. Republican constitutional arguments for the separation of powers within
the state can then be used against classical modern sovereignty, so that republican
cosmopolitan institutions ought to further separate powers by disaggregating state
monopolies and functions into a variety of institutional levels and locations as
well as by disaggregating centralized transnational powers and redistributing
them to citizens and opening them up to their deliberation.
One clear instance of this constitutionalism is implicit in the institutionaliza-
tion of human rights in the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and the recent Charter of Rights. What is the purpose of this new layer of
human rights enforcement beyond that already provided by the constitutions of
member states? With the accompanying supranational European Court of Human
Rights that grants rights of individual petition, there are (at least in the juridical
dimension) multiple new institutions and memberships that can be invoked in
making claims about human rights. Such overlapping differentiated and pol-
yarchical structures permit greater realization of these rights and their claims
against domination, as the citizens of demoi exercise the various entitlements
gained from their overlapping memberships. In such a structure, human rights are
constitutive of membership in a plural democratic polity and become a secure
10 As argued by both Will Kymlicka and Robert Dahl in their contributions to Democracy’s Edges.
11 See Jo Shaw, «The Interpretation of European Citizenship», The Modern Law Review 40
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basis on which to assess new governance institutions procedurally, including, for
example, the transparency of committees and the broad inclusion of participants
in deliberations related to committees and methods of policy coordination. Even
without any police powers, such differentiated institutions best realize rights in
multiple demoi with diverse entitlements rather than in a single form of citizen-
ship that uniquely constitutes the demos. Notice also that the explicit constitution-
alism of the enumerated rights of the Charter promotes this kind of democratic
structure, especially in the ways in which the Charter asserts the legal supremacy
of the content of human rights at all levels.
How do multiple levels and sites promote the democratic minimum, and espe-
cially its central normative power of initiating deliberation about claims to jus-
tice? We can answer this question in two ways. One way is to see how the institu-
tional design and practices of the EU could be used to promote this fundamental
normative power, the power that is basic to the right to have rights. The EU could
do so by providing a variety of locations and sites for deliberation in which
publics interact with institutional powers and authorities. This division of powers
could not be exclusively territorial or else it would be indistinguishable from a
large nation state. The second way to promote deliberation follows from these fea-
tures. To achieve more robust interaction across various levels and diverse locales
and to promote citizens’ capacity to initiate deliberation at multiple levels, large
federalist institutions require a written constitution. If the EU is already well-
ordered and institutionally thick, then a new federalism need not reorganize insti-
tutions as much as settle the specific constitutional question: how is it that this
structure can be sufficiently reflexive so as to make it democratic in the sense that
issues of the nature of the polity, of rights and duties, must pass through the pub-
lic deliberation of all its citizens?
Given the shape of the political institutions of the European polity, most cos-
mopolitans argue that the first step towards a supranational democratic order is to
create a more effective and empowered European Parliament (EP), perhaps with a
bicameral structure. The point here is not to see the EP as some privileged source
of democratic legitimacy but as one of the locations for distributing deliberative
and popular powers. This would clearly shift the location of various normative
powers in Community institutions – including the rights to initiate legislation, to
set directives and objectives for administrative bodies, and to review implementa-
tion in conjunction with the Commission – from the Council to the people. As an
elected body, the EP can potentially represent and empower more diverse inter-
ests. With the general weakening of legislative bodies now found in many large
nation states, however, it is unclear whether such a body would in fact overcome
the gap between European institutions and the interests of the citizens they sup-
posedly represent. The problem is not that the traditional separation of powers in
federal constitutions would too radically alter the current shape of the EU, but that
such a separation now needs to be understood in terms of a plurality of overlap-
ping processes of distributed will formation11.
(1999), 293-317.
12 Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, «The Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism», Colum-
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While the current draft constitution does indeed support greater parliamentary
powers (including new powers of legislative and policy initiative), it is unclear
whether introducing a further source of legislative initiative is really so problem-
atic in a structure that already has several, and needs them in order to promote a
thickly institutionalized democratic minimum. So long as the EP is not the sole
source of legislative legitimacy, a new constitutional right to be included among
these institutional bodies able to initiate policy debates could function as one
among many mechanisms for public influence and accountability. It could do so
in virtue of its tiered structure, which has the advantages of large and numerous
legislatures that permit the emergence of a forum in which many diverse cultural
and social perspectives are gathered. By reforming the EP with greater powers of
initiative, the public spheres with which it interacts thereby acquire greater access
to influence necessary for the constructive use of their communicative freedom in
defining the terms of debate and deliberation. This proposal thus helps the EU
meet the democratic minimum, if only with indirect legitimacy.
Nonetheless, simply giving the EP greater powers is insufficient to meet the
democratic minimum for processes of democratic reform. Rather, more direct
forms of public deliberation have emerged within the polyarchy of various proce-
dures of responsive implementation of basic policies. This issue concerns the
form of inquiry that institutions take to be necessary to inform their decision-mak-
ing processes. As Charles Sabel and Joshua Cohen have argued, a «directly delib-
erative» design in many ways incorporates epistemic innovations and increased
capabilities of economic organizations in the same way as, for instance, the New
Deal institutions in the United States followed the innovations of industrial orga-
nization in the centralized mass production they attempted to administer and reg-
ulate12. Roughly, such a directly deliberative form of organization uses nested and
collaborative forms of decision-making based on highly collaborative processes
of jointly defining problems and setting goals already typical in many large firms
with dispersed sites of production. These forms of organization have been estab-
lished in constitutional orders that do not require uniform policies, but permit a
broad range of experimental initiatives, with public testing across levels and sites
of mutual accountability and authority.
Given these requirements necessary for plural and dispersed polities, directly
deliberative designs have a new salience, which is perhaps surprising only in light
of previous turns toward centralization as solutions to problems of scale. Non-
domination requires yet a different strategy, and I have already discussed the ways
in which distributive publics or minipublics open up new directly deliberative
possibilities for reform. Here we can see directly deliberative deigns as a way of
producing distributed rather than plebescitory or «mass» popular legitimacy, the
legitimacy to vote either yes or no in a referendum on some democratic reform
and to participate in a mass public that is persuaded by various appeals for its loy-
alty. Such mass publics are particularly important in saying no to inadequate or
self-defeating democratic reforms that do not increase overall democratic legiti-
macy. We might think of these mass publics as mobilized when the issues of
reform reach a broad enough audience to give them the popular salience that they
bia Law Review 1 (1996), 292ff.
13 See Charles Sabel and Joshua Cohen, «Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US», in Governing
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lacked. However, such publics at best capture de facto public opinion and should
best be seen as indicating that the popular will lacked sufficiently opportunities to
be formed more fully and deliberatively.
In the European context, this deliberative design is often considered to be a
form of rule by committee, or «comitology», with deliberative features. Under the
current institutional structure and its Community Method, the power to initiate
such policy coordination and testing lies solely with the Council. While not yet
democratic, they can become a structural model of practices of inquiry for demo-
cratic reform. This mode of inquiry is explicitly recognized by the 2004 Conven-
tion in Article III, although none of its practices, such as the Open Method of
Coordination (OMC) discussed below, are specifically named (Articles III-107,
148, 179, 180), and the powers of initiative and of policy coordination are still cur-
rently left entirely with the Commission13. Distributing such powers to a single
location rather than across multiple levels and sites in the overall structure violates
the basic institutional principle of republican federalism that powers ought to be
widely distributed and iterated at various levels. At present, they lack the deliber-
ative and popular legitimacy that would be necessary to make them useful ways of
organizing a reflective equilibrium among competing public proposals.
The biggest difference between the EU and such delegative institutions as the
WTO is precisely that the EU is itself a polity and thus already has a constitutional
framework for accountability through open and multiperspectival deliberative
inquiry. The EU’s explicit recognition of political rights as human rights empow-
ers those affected by authoritative decisions with normative powers, including
rights of participation. This makes it possible for citizens of the EU to make
claims rather than simply challenge decisions; that is, they may appeal not only to
basic principles of democracy and human rights, but also to political institutions
that should be responsive to their claims, and to a political community beyond that
constituted by some specific functional task or treaty provision.
Constitutionalism also has another wider and more important role, to the
extent that it is internalized in deliberative institutions: not only does it create
some broad institutional distinctions between good and bad reasons; it also creates
the demand for reflective equilibrium in decision making. Such equilibrium is
necessary because norms of deliberation are part of the normative framework of
inquiry into possible institutional reforms, so that at the very least actors are con-
strained to show the coherence of specific norms and decisions involving basic
Work and Welfare in the New Economy: European and American Experiments, J. Zeitlin and D. Trubek
eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 345-375. For directly deliberative arguments in favor of
constitutionalizing the OMC, see Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, «Active Welfare, Experimental
Governance, Pragmatic Constitutionalism: The New Transformation of Europe», (unpublished manu-
script) presented at the International Conference of the Hellenic Presidency of the European Union,
«The Modernization of the European Social Model & EU Policies and Instruments», Ioannina,
Greece, 21-22 May, 2003. Here the point is to subject the OMC to the procedural requirements of «full
blast» publicity. For a contrasting and more indirect view of the deliberative potential of the OMC, see
Kerstin Jacobsson and Asa Vifell, «Integration by Deliberation? On the Role of Committees in the
Open Method of Coordination», in European Governance, Deliberation, and the Quest for Democra-
tization, E. Eriksen, C. Joerges, and Jürgen Neyer (eds.), (Oslo, ARENA, 2003), 411-451.
14 Jürgen Neyer, «Discourse and Order», Journal of Common Market Studies (2003), 41: 687-
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norms. On the basis of this equilibrium effect of constitutionalization, Neyer
argues that «noncompliance with the outcome of a deliberative procedure not only
rejects the specific deal [that has been reached], but implicitly opposes the whole
normative structure of which the specific norm is a part»14. To be truly democra-
tic and reflexive, however, participants must be empowered to change the norma-
tive framework as well. Otherwise, constitutions would not have the resources to
institute the requisite change within continuity that is necessary to retain their
reflexive and polity-building roles.
By placing it in a normative and political framework, delegated authority is
embedded in a polity and a reflexive legal order that constrains its exercise by
empowering citizens to make legitimate claims independently of the particular
epistemic community typically given such authority in functional organizations.
However much such epistemic communities may constrain the exercise of author-
ity and open decision-making processes to reflect exogenous influences, they fil-
ter such influences through their authoritative perspective, usually in order to
reflect their current common theoretical commitments. Comitology goes a step
further by embedding such deliberative processes in a wider set of political com-
mitments and constraints of institutionalized interaction. Even if committees pro-
vide incentives for argumentation and reason giving rather than bargaining among
institutional actors, they do not by themselves organize sufficient opportunities
for empowered discursive interaction to be responsive to a wide range of influ-
ences and perspectives. Calls for greater transparency or for participation by civil
society are not really the answer, however, since the weaknesses here are more
structural. The transnational principle of institutional differentiation (rather than
the simple separation of powers) calls for multiple and iterated processes within a
revisable normative framework.
How do weaknesses in its deliberative institutions contribute to the EU’s
democratic deficit? Here the difficulty lies not with the breadth of its deliberative
processes, but rather with their democratic depth. Even on the best interpretation
offered by their defenders, committees currently function as forums for political
processes and as coordinating bodies across various levels of governance; they
are, however, deficient as argumentative forums to the extent that they are only
«semi-public» and relate primarily to networks of administrative agencies and pri-
vate policy experts15. A committee-based procedure, however deliberative, retains
the weaknesses of the hierarchical relations of experts, officials and citizens
within which it is embedded. In cases of democratic reform, a minipublic provides
an institutionally constructed intermediary in popular will formation, although it
could act in such as way as to become an agent for the creation of a larger public
with normative powers.
Organized in this way, institutionalized deliberation becomes more responsive
by virtue of strengthening and shortening the feedback loops necessary for imple-
15 See, for example, Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer, «From Intergovernmental Bargaining to
Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalization of Comitology», European Law Journal 3
(1997), 273-299.
16 Frank Michelman, Brennan and the Supreme Court (Princeton, Princeton University Press,
2002), 59.
17 Bruce Ackerman, We the People, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1991), ch. 1.
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mentation and learning in decentered, yet public decision making. Democracy
could be deepened by such empowerment, and it could also be broadened by facil-
itating interaction between institutions and publics, especially if they institute
something closer to what Frank Michelman calls the «full blast condition» for
deliberation16. In other respects, the current constitutional moment is also an insti-
tutional learning process that is rather like the case of the New Deal-type reforms
of the American nation state, motivated by both democratic and functional failures
of its existing, not fully constitutionalized use of administrative and political
power17. It might also permit the emergence of wider and deeper forms of deliber-
ative interaction across institutions and demoi than have been realized thus far.
Since deliberation in transnational polities does not aim at the same solutions to
all problems, it requires only that EU-level institutions serve to establish the legit-
imate diversity, which would be constitutionalized in provisions related to the nor-
mative status of membership, with these in turn based on human rights. In order to
institutionalize experimental practices, the constitution must reflect such a multi-
level and federalist division of normative powers. Deliberative legitimacy is then
tied directly to the presumption of plurality, which could be built into the consti-
tution of a transnational democracy.
If the constitutional order helps build the polity, this leaves open an important
question: who are the citizens of the Europolity? Given the new immigration in
Europe, the public sphere is undergoing a different «structural transformation»
with the potential for the domination of citizens over noncitizen residents and
immigrants without the empowered participation and recognition of the latter as
members of the public with communicative freedom18. The transformation of
inquiry in the EU on the effects of policies on human rights and normative pow-
ers also depends on incorporating a cosmopolitan perspective of the Generalized
Other into its public judgments and practices of assessment. The duties of EU cit-
izens to the large numbers of noncitizens who reside in the EU include granting
them some powers to influence deliberative processes, so that these remain demo-
cratically legitimate. With their commitments to human rights contained in the
Charter of Rights explicitly constitutionalized, a more democratic EU would have
greater constitutionally based obligations toward nonmembers, obligations that
already exist in virtue of all residents of Europe having the normative powers that
emerge from the commitments of a democracy of demoi.
Given the variety of constitutional moments in United States history that Ackerman discusses, it would
be a mistake to see constitutional moments of «higher law making» in existing democratic polities as
always emanating from the People. The lack of such a source in the case of the EU Convention is not
exceptional, although the new proposal should the current one fail will likely go through some popu-
lar ratification procedure.
18 The concept of a «structural transformation» is defined in this way by Habermas, The Struc-
tural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). Habermas’s writings on the
EU surprisingly insist upon standard parliamentary institutions rather than upon exploring their poten-
tial structural transformation. My argument here is more consistent with his previous analyses of the
legitimation crisis of the modern state.
19 Stephen Castles and M. J. Miller, The Age of Immigration (London, St. Martin’s, 1999).
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This cosmopolitan perspective may also provide the impetus for ongoing col-
lective learning at the constitutional level to go beyond some of the limits of the
EU as a bounded community. For human political rights to be realized, the EU
must be a community within a larger political community, a collection of demoi
integrated as a larger democratic community. This transforms the problem of
boundaries from an external to an internal one. With the recognition of the full
range of human rights of all persons within a complex and differentiated institu-
tional structure, the EU shifts from a regional to a cosmopolitan polity. Although
the distributive publics and institutional deliberation can be iterated across regions
as much as across states, this internalization of the perspective of the human polit-
ical community provides the greatest potential for the democratization of the
European polity. This requires a stronger and more demanding recognition of the
right to nationality, with the danger that the failure to incorporate noncitizens
«may lead to divided societies marked by severe inequalities and conflicts»,
including permanent minorities and excluded groups at the regional level19.
Democracies with deep commitments to human rights have special obligations to
humanity and thus to the nondomination of noncitizens in ways that nondemocra-
tic polities to not. Such deep inequalities and conflicts also describe the source of
the democratic deficit at the international level, and the failure of international
institutions and forms of authority to incorporate the perspective of humanity. It is
in this respect and not merely in its institutional structure and commitment to mul-
tilateral foreign policy that the EU could provide a model for transnational democ-
ratization. Without this cosmopolitan dimension, the constitutional framework
would lack the universality to locate developing claims to rights of citizenship
within a highly differentiated institutional order.
CONCLUSION:
RESOLVING THE PARADOX OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM
If extending and deepening democracy are among the aims of the constitu-
tional reform of the EU, it is easy to see why such a project is the continuation of
what is best in the EU. In order to be democratic, the EU must not only achieve a
democratic form of regional integration, it must also meet the repeated challenge
of creating the conditions for democratic nondomination given the polity building
of European integration. Given that meeting this challenge demands a transna-
tional democratic minimum, the constitutional debates in the EU could well be a
precursor to a process that is iterated in many different polities and many different
institutions. From a constitutional perspective, the signal innovations of the EU
could be given greater coherence by putting them in the service of realizing a
democracy of demoi rather than in a single demos. Once the EU achieves a more
fully reflexive order and a more differentiated institutional structure, the question
shifts away from whether the EU is a democracy to how it can be more delibera-
tively and popularly legitimate. Such deliberation might be made more feasible if
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 109
it were to attain greater popular legitimacy and more vibrant publics. The task of
its reform is to create just these conditions.
A crucial claim of my argument is that the differentiated and deliberative
processes that the new constitution would enable are at the same time the proper
model for the constitution making process itself. Constitutional assemblies at least
in part construct the public to whom they make a proposal to be ratified. While not
a founding moment, these reforms should initiate a new phase in which the citi-
zens of Europe begin the process of constructing institutions by which they gov-
ern themselves. If this is the problem that the constitution must solve, the first task
that the Council should undertake is to empower the public to deliberate and pro-
pose some of the means to achieve these aims and democratic reforms.
Should the citizens of Europe create a new constitution? An affirmative
answer implies that European integration has reached a more explicit and reflex-
ive polity-building stage and that EU authority is willing to do more than just sub-
ject the results of their deliberation to the ratification according to the opinions of
its mass publics. These citizens have judged and may well in the future continue
to judge that the process lacks the legitimacy necessary for democratic reform.
Democratic legitimacy across demoi is the work of generations and thus cannot be
achieved simply by the act of writing and ratifying a constitution. A democratic
constitution for Europe will not create a demos but it will create a basis for legiti-
mate democratic reform that is currently lacking in the EU.
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